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PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 
SINCE THE EVENTS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 
Mr. President of Golden Gate University, 
The Dean of the School of Law, 
Distinguished Fulbright Scholars in Residence, 
Honorable members of the American Society of International Law 
and of the American Society of Comparative Law, 
Fellow Members of GGU Faculty, 
Consoeurs et Confreres : 
It is twelve years ago that Golden Gate University initiated its first Annual Fulbright 
Symposium on international legal developments. Today we are celebrating the close of the first 
cycle of the Annual Fulbright Symposia. 
Simultaneously Golden Gate University School of Law is hosting the initiation of the 
second decade of international law. It is the Eleventh Regional Meeting of the American Society 
of International Law. 
It is this time of year that international scholars and practitioners of international law in 
diverse fields are gathered at Golden Gate from the region of the Bay Area and beyond to pursue 
a meaningful exchange of views among themselves and with learned counterparts from outside 
the United States, notably a selected body of Fulbright Scholars in Residence and comparatists 
from within and without the region. 
Last year Golden Gate launched its second decade entitled "THE DAWNING OF A 
NEW ERA FOR THE EVOLVING RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW." This year a 
succession of events have taken place which deserve the closest attention of observers of the rule 
of international law and order in the making. 
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The events of 11 September 2001, which sent shock waves to the conscience of mankind 
the world over, have entailed other consequences unattended by perpetrators of the terrorist acts 
against the United States and little suspected by the international community at the time. To 
every action, there is a reaction. The wheel of international justice moves slowly but surely as 
it requires necessary accompaniments, especially the overwhelming support of the global 
community and the underlying rule of international law on the subject. 
I. THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 set the stage for an accelerated pace in the 
progressive concretization of rules of international law on the topic of State Responsibility with 
particular regard to its application to the breach of the primary rule of international law 
governing international liability. 
Under pre-existing international law, a State is liable, irrespective of fault or proof of 
wrongfulness, for its failure to prevent the occurrence of harm or infliction on another State or 
States of injurious consequences arising out of activities initiated or conducted in the territory 
within its jurisdiction or control. 11 While States and international and regional organizations 
promptly responded to the apparent urgent universal call for the cessation, suspension and 
immediate termination or discontinuance of such nefarious activities, the forces of destruction 
continue vigorously to threaten and to terrorize the global community. International terrorists 
persisted in their relentless efforts to inflict untold pain, sorrow and sufferings, accompanying 
the menacing reign of terror, striking innumerable indiscriminate fatal blows at countless 
members of the international community, regardless of their creed, religion, belief, gender, age, 
nationality or political ideology and affiliation. 
I] 
General principles of the law of State Responsibility appear intimately involved in 
The duty of care is place squarely on the State, from whose territory harmful activities 
emanated, transgressing national boundaries, or activities otherwise within its jurisdiction 
or control. Liability is therefore based on the territoriality principle or the principle of 
jurisdiction or control of the State which is held to be strictly if not indeed absolutely 
liable for the injurious harms. 
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connection with circumstances precluding wrongfulness, such as counter-measures21 and self-
defense. 31 It is of primary interest to ascertain the legal consequences of an internationally 
wrongful act, in particular the rights of the injured State41 and the obligations of the State which 
has committed the internationally wrongful act, 51 as well as the rights and obligations of third 
States. 61 Theories based on the practice of States and of competent international and regional 
organizations deserve an examination in the light of the on-going crisis that continues to threaten 
the peace and security of mankind. 
In addition to a critical analysis of the relevant part of the law of State Responsibility, 
attention will also be directed to two other areas of international legal development in 
contemporary international law and practice. The first concerns the primary rule of law on the 
international liability of a State for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by 
international law. The second relates to the concerted international actions and measures in 
pursuit of individual offenders perpetrating organized crimes under the law of nations, the grave 
crime of international terrorism, targeting primarily on one State in particular, symbolizing the 
free world but ultimately directed against the international community as a whole, being a 
serious crime under international law designated as an offence against the peace and security of 
mankind. The crime of 11 international terrorism II, as such, should be revisited in the context of 
2] 
3] 
4] 
5] 
6] 
In Draft Articles on State Responsibility, adopted at second reading by the Drafting 
Committee of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. AICN .4/SR.2662, appendix 
to the Report of eh ILC, New York 2000, GA Doc. Supplement No.lO (A/55/10) at pp. 
110 et seq. Part II, Chapter II : Counter-measures, especially Articles 50-55, as well as 
Article 23 : Counter-measures in regard to an internationally wrongful act. 
See Ibid., Draft Article 22 : Self-Defence. 
See Ibid. , Draft Articles 43 and 44 : The right of the injured State or States to demand 
compliance and the form of reparation. 
See Ibid. , Draft Article 28 : Legal consequences of an international wrongful act; 
Article 29 : The continuing obligation of the State responsibility to perform the obligation 
breached; Article 30 : Obligation to cease and desist and non-recurrence; and Article 
31 : Obligation to make reparation. 
See Ibid. , Draft Articles 41 and 42 : Consequences of grave violations of obligations 
owing to the international community as a whole (erga omnes). 
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the events of 11 September 2001. 
II. STRICT INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR STATES 
GENERATING INTERNATIONAL INJURIES 
Strict or absolute international liability of States may be traceable to Draft Article 27 
(former Article 35) of State Responsibility, which states that the existence of circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness in this Chapter (Chapter V Part I) is without prejudice : a) to the 
respect for the obligation in question or its extent if the circumstance precluding wrongfulness 
no longer exists; or b) to the question of compensation for the injuries or material losses suffered 
as the result of that international wrongful act.71 Therefore, even where wrongfulness is 
precluded, a State may still be liable for the injurious consequence it has effectively caused or 
allowed to occur, or indeed failed to prevent. On this general principle is based a primary rule 
of law fastening strict or absolute liability on the State on whose territory or under whose 
jurisdiction or control activities conducted thereon or thereunder have resulted in transnational 
harms or inflicted injuries or material losses across and beyond the limits of its national 
jurisdiction or territorial boundaries. 
This primary duty on the part of the State to prevent the occurrence of harms across its 
frontiers and beyond has initially developed from transboundary pollution or emission of 
transfrontier air pollutants as in the case of Trail Smelter between the United States and Canada 
in 1938 and 1941.81 The origin of this primary obligation under contemporary international law 
has its foundation in the Roman Law and Anglo-American common law, as evidenced by the 
Latin maxim : sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which literally means "use your property in 
such a way as not to harm others". This concept of liability is based on restrictive enjoyment 
of one's own property, or limited and regulated use of proprietary rights subject to the need to 
prevent harm to others. It appears to be a primary obligation towards the international 
7) 
8) 
See Ibid. , Draft Article 27 (35) at pp. 116-117. 
3 Report of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA) 1905 (Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal 
1938-1941). 
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community as a whole or an obligatio erga omnes, so that there is a primary duty on the part 
of every State to undertake precautionary measures that are consistent with obligation to prevent 
harm. 91 
This was emphatically endorsed by Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration 1972 in 
these words :-
Principle 21 : States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Principles of International Law, the sovereign rights ..... and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to . . . . . other States or . . . . . areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction. "101 
This principle has been identified with the primary rule of strict liability initially for 
environmental damage to neighboring States. In time, the rule has been extended to cover 
injuries and losses suffered by persons beyond the immediately adjacent territories. Settlements 
of bilateral disputes between States illustrate far reaching coverage of this rule of law as in the 
Lake Lanoux Arbitration (1957)111 and in the settlement of the Gut Dam Claims (1969). 121 
In these cases, the rule that a State must refrain from harming its neighbors, received further 
application with far wider implication. A State must also prevent harm in the territories of 
adjacent States and beyond. It has given rise to the European Polluter Pays Principle as in the 
pollution of the River Rhine131 which runs across western Europe from Switzerland through 
9] 
10] 
11] 
12] 
13] 
See, e.g., Report of the ILC covering the work of its 44th Session, ss. 112-276, UN 
Doc. A/47/10 (1992), reprinted (1992) 2 Yearbook of ILC, Part 2, at 1. 18-41, UN. 
Doc. A/CN.41, Ser, A/1992/Add/1 (Part 2). 
Stockholm, 5-11 June 1972; UN Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972); reprinted in 11 ILM 1416 
(1972). 
France v. Spain, 24 International Law Reports 101 (Arb.Trib. 1957). 
USA v. Canada, 8 ILM 118 (Lake Lanoux Claims Tribunal1969). 
Convention Relating to the Protection of the Rhine against Chemical Pollutants (with 
alUlexes), Dec. 3, 197 6, UNTS I -17 511. Compare the Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and other Matters, Dec. 29, 1972, 11 ILM 1291 
(1973). See also the Brussels Convention on Establishment of an International Fund for 
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the Federal Republic of Germany to the Netherlands and Belgium. The losses and injuries were 
suffered by the communities in the riparian States. 
In the Corfu Channel Case (1949), 141 it should be observed that the International Court 
of Justice held Albania liable for failure to warn international shipping of the existence of mines 
within its waters, of which Albania ought to have known. In any event, the knowledge of their 
existence was imputed to Albania with the consequential duty to warn the sea-faring nations of 
the existence of the danger to enhance the safety in international navigation through the 
international waterway, the Corfu Channel. 
This rule of strict or absolute liability under international law is based on the analogy of 
private law, common law as well as civil law. The law of land-owners' liabilities or liabilities 
of occupiers of premises has its counterpart. The vicarious liability of an owner of a dangerous 
animal, such as a tiger or a vicious dog, may entail the possibility of noxal surrender. 
In the case under review, the fact that Afghanistan under the Taliban Government, not 
only did not attempt to prevent the disaster from occurring but also failed to surrender the 
alleged offenders who caused the injuries and losses to the United States and the international 
community. In addition to these grave omissions, the Afghan Tali ban authorities also attempted 
to conceal the truth and refused to disclose the hide-outs or whereabouts of the AI Qaeda within 
Afghan territories under Afghan jurisdiction and control. Without at this stage examining the 
degree of guilt and complicity of the Taliban authorities for the international acts of terrorism 
of 11 September 2001 and the continuing threats of terror, it is sufficiently if not abundantly 
clear that the host State, Afghanistan, from where the attacks originated, must bear the 
responsibility under the primary rule of international law : sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. 
The liability of Afghanistan is established beyond doubts. The fate of the Taliban for the 
destruction of the image of the standing Buddha appears inevitable under the Karmic Law : for 
every evil deed there is a sanction, and for each good deed a reward is awaiting. 
Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1981, 834 UNTS 17-46. 
141 UK v. Albania, 1949, ICJ Report 4 (Merit april 9). Albania was held liable because 
"nothing was attempted by the Albanian authorities to prevent the disaster. The grave 
omissions involved the international responsibility of Albania. " 
Ill. QUANTIFICATION OF COMPENSATION, SELF-DEFENSE, 
PRE-EMPTIVE STATES AND COUNTER-MEASURE 
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Once liability of the State of Afghanistan is established for the injuries and losses suffered 
by others, an assessment could be made of the quantum of the reparation required of it to wipe 
out the consequences of the internationally wrongful act. 151 The irony of the matter is that any 
conservative estimate of the amount of compensation under international law would be far 
beyond the capacity of the successor government of Afghanistan, let alone the Afghan population 
who stands in dire need of international rescue and assistance .. 
Other legal discussions relate to the exercise of self-defense which is the inherent right 
of every State, and the United States is not excluded. The danger of an unannounced suicidal 
attack against the United States everywhere has in no way receded, hence the right of the United 
States is recognized to exercise its legitimate self-defense. Care should be taken in the exercise 
of the right of self-defense that all the elements of an armed attack must be present, the danger 
of an attack being overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for 
deliberation. 161 Furthermore, measures of self-defense have to be proportional to the risk and 
limited in scope as well as in time. Pre-emptive strikes have to be based on the need for self-
defense and similarly restricted in application. 
Counter-measures, on the other hand have other limitations, and only legitimate counter-
measures are permissible. A State contemplating counter-measures does so at its own risk, i.e., 
the risk of excessiveness, which will engage its own responsibility. In any event, forcible 
counter-measures or the use of force in the implementation of counter-measures must have been 
approved by the international community, such as the Security Council, the principal organ of 
the United Nations, primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
15) 
16) 
See the Chorzow Factory Case, Germany v. Poland, PCIJ Ser. A., No 9, p. 31 (1927). 
See The Caroline, 2 Moore, International Law 409-414 (1906); Robert Jennings, The 
Caroline and Macleod cases, 32 AJIL 82 (1983). 
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IV. TREATMENT OF ALLEGED TERRORISTS 
Much debate has taken place surrounding the treatment of the Taliban and AI Qaeda 
detainees, who for reasons of collective safety based partly on the precautionary principle have 
been isolated and kept under preventive detention at a United States base in Cuba at Quantanamo 
Bay. Questions have been raised regarding the applicability of the Geneva Convention of 1949 
and Protocols of 1977, especially in regard to the Taliban and the AI Qaeda detainees, their right 
to counsel, right of appeal and right to a fair trial. This concern should not detract from the 
tense situation and potentials of further repetition of terrorist suicidal acts, harmful to society 
and fatal to the terrorists themselves. 
Whatever types of proceedings selected by the United States for the trial and criminal 
process, it should be recalled that, not unlike pirates ex jure gentium, even though enemies of 
mankind (hostes generis humani), they are nonetheless human beings, entitled to be treated as 
such, and protected by international humanitarian law including their entitlements to the rights 
and dignity of man. The eyes of the world are watching the actions taken by the United States, 
which is bound to conduct itself in an exemplary manner, having regard to the oft-cited 
invocation of the international RULE OF LAW, for which the United States must not relinquish 
its responsibility as champion. 
V. RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
It is customary for the Annual Meeting to discuss landmark decisions of the International 
Court of Justice in the months preceding the occasion. This past year has seen two celebrated 
cases worthy of the most careful attention, namely, the case concerning the execution of Walter 
La Grand (Federal Republic of Germany v. United States of America, ICJ. Report, 27 June 2001 
and the Judgment of 14 February 2002 in The Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, ICJ 
Report, 2002. 
The LaGrand Case 
To our incredulous but pleasant amazement, the Federal Republic of Germany, unlike 
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Paraguay, did not relinquish its pursuits against the United States even after the execution of 
Walter LaGrand in the face of provisional measures indicated by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ Report 1999, p. 9 para. 6) in the following terms :-
(a) The United States of America should take all measures at its 
disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the 
final decision of these proceedings and should inform the Court of 
all the measures which it has taken in implementation of this 
order; 
(b) The Government of the United States of America should submit 
this Order to the Governor of the State of Arizona. 
On the same day as the above of 3 March 1999, proceedings were brought by Germany 
in the United States Supreme Court against the United States and the Governor of Arizona, 
seeking inter alia to enforce compliance with this Court's Order indicating provisional measures. 
In the course of these proceedings, the United States Solicitor General, as counsel of record took 
the position, inter alia, that "an order of the International Court of Justice indicating provisional 
measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief." On the same date, the 
Supreme Court dismissed the motion by Germany on the ground of the tardiness of Germany's 
application and of jurisdictional barrier under United States domestic law. On the same day, 
proceedings were also instituted in the United States Supreme Court by Walter LaGrand. These 
proceedings were decided against him. Later that day, Walter LaGrand was executed. 
The United States acknowledged and did not contest Germany's basic claim, that there 
was a breach of its obligation under Article 36 (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, "promptly to inform the LeGrand brothers that they could ask that a German Consular 
post be notified of their arrest and detention. 
Germany argued in its second submission that under Article 36 (2) of the Vienna 
Convention, the United States was under an obligation to ensure that its municipal "laws and 
regulations enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this 
Article are intended: and that it "is in breach of this obligation by upholding rules of domestic 
law which make it impossible successfully to raise a violation of the right to consular notification 
in proceedings subsequent to a conviction of a defendant by a jury. " The Court found for 
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The Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incument 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes 
they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar 
prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom 
it applies from all criminal responsibility. Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under 
international law by an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar 
to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances. The Court refers to circumstances where such 
persons are tried in their own countries, where the State which they represent or have 
represented decides to waive that immunity, where such persons no longer enjoy all the 
immunities accorded by international law in other States after ceasing to hold the office of 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and where such persons are subject to criminal proceedings before 
certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction. 
Finally, the Court finds that the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Y erodia Ndombasi of the 
arrest warrant of 11 April 2000. and its international circulation, constituted violatins of a legal 
obligation of the Kingdom of Belgium towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in that 
they failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the 
incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo enjoyed under 
international law. 
The Court also finds that the Kingdom of Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, 
cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and so inform the authorities to whom that warrant 
was circulated. 
Thus, the wheel of international justice continues to progress at its own speed as surely 
as the earth rotates around the sun. 
Sompong Sucharitkul 
28 March 2002 
